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A dynamical systems model of unorganized segregation
D. J. Haw*and S. J. Hogan
Abstract
We consider Schelling’s bounded neighbourhood model (BNM) of unorganised segregation of two populations
from the perspective of modern dynamical systems theory. We derive a Schelling dynamical system and carry out a
complete quantitative analysis of the system for the case of a linear tolerance schedule in both populations.
In doing so, we recover and generalise Schelling’s qualitative results. For the case of unlimited population
movement, we derive exact formulae for regions in parameter space where stable integrated population mixes can
occur. We show how neighbourhood tipping can be adequately explained in terms of basins of attraction.
For the case of limiting population movement, we derive exact criteria for the occurrence of new population mixes
and identify the stable cases. We show how to apply our methodology to nonlinear tolerance schedules, illustrating
our approach with numerical simulations.
We associate each term in our Schelling dynamical system with a social meaning. In particular we show that the
dynamics of one population in the presence of another can be summarised as follows
{rate of population change} = {intrinsic popularity of neighbourhood}− {finite size of neighbourhood}− {presence of other population}
By approaching the dynamics from this perspective, we have a complementary approach to that of the tolerance
schedule.
1 Models of segregation
Segregation is "the action or state of setting someone or something apart from others or the enforced
separation of different racial groups in a country, community, or establishment" (collectively known as
organized segregation) or it can occur as the result of the "interplay of individual choices" (known as
unorganized segregation) [15, 16]. In terms of societal, political and economic outcomes, segregation is
widely regarded as undesirable. It is the opposite of integration.
Schelling’s spatial proximity model (SPM) [15, 16] was the first model of unorganized segregation. It is a
discrete-time spatial (agent-based) model that uses a chequerboard framework in which cells (representing
physical units such as a house in a street or a bed in a dormitory) are occupied - or not - by equal numbers
of two different types of agents. At each time-step, agents remain where they are unless the proportion of
agents of the other type in their neighbourhood exceeds a given threshold, in which case they move to
a vacant cell. Many variants of this model exist, including different group sizes and tolerance demands
[18], different methods of relocation [11, 13, 22], non-lattice topologies [10, 12], and simulations based on
demographic and geographical data ([2, 3, 4, 5, 19]). The emergent behaviour of all such models is the
same: even in highly-tolerant populations, a small preference for familiarity in one’s immediate neighbours
is sufficient to induce geographical segregation [7, 8, 10, 12].
In the same papers, Schelling [15, 16] also introduced the bounded neighbourhood model (BNM), which
has been seldom pursued in the literature [1, 6]. It is the purpose of this paper to examine Schelling’s BNM
within the framework of modern dynamical systems theory [20]. In doing so, we recover Schelling’s results
analytically, generalise them and give some new results.
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2 SCHELLING’S BOUNDED NEIGHBOURHOOD MODEL (BNM)
2 Schelling’s bounded neighbourhood model (BNM)
In Schelling’s bounded neighbourhood model (BNM) [15, 16], the population is divided into two types.
Both populations can have different tolerance limits. A neighbourhood is like a district within a city, or
a workplace/social group. An individual in that neighbourhood moves out if they are not happy with
the population mix there. In the neighbourhood, every member of the population is concerned about the
distribution of the types of agents, not with any particular configuration.
Let X(t) ≥ 0 and Y(t) ≥ 0 denote the density of two population types inhabiting the neighbourhood, as
a function of time t. Note that Schelling [15, 16] refers to W (Whites) and B (Blacks).
In the neighbourhood, tolerance limits are allocated to a given population type via a tolerance schedule.
The X-type tolerance schedule RX(X) describes the minimum ratio X/Y required in order for all of the
X population to remain in that neighbourhood. A similar function RY(Y) describes the tolerance of the
Y-type population. Schelling [15, 16] made the following assumptions:
1. The neighbourhood is preferred over other locations: populations of both type will enter/remain
unless tolerance conditions are violated.
2. The tolerance schedule is specific to the location being studied.
3. Each member of the population is aware of the ratio of population types within the neighbourhood at
the moment the decision is made to enter/remain/leave.
4. There is no lower bound on tolerance, that is, no population insists on the presence of the opposing
type.
5. Tolerance schedules are monotone decreasing, i.e. the more tolerant population is first to enter and
last to leave.
Schelling’s initial example of a tolerance schedule is linear, as shown in Figure 1a. In this paper, we take
units of population density such that Xmax = 1 = kYmax for some k > 0 (Schelling initially sets Xmax = 100
and Ymax = 50, so k = 2). The most tolerant member of the X-population can abide a Y ∶ X ratio of a ∶ 1, half
of the X-population can tolerate a ratio of a/2 ∶ 1, and the least tolerant member of the X-population can
abide no members of the Y-population. Likewise, the most tolerant member of the Y-population can abide
a X ∶ Y ratio of b ∶ 1 etc. We have a, b > 0, and we can assume that k ≥ 1, so that Y denotes the minority
population.
(a) Linear tolerance schedules (b) A reproduction of [16], Figure 18.
Figure 1: Schelling’s first example: linear tolerance schedules and their translation the phase plane.
Each population has its own tolerance limit. For the X-population, this is the value of Y-population
above which the X-population will leave and below which there will be an X-population influx.
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These limits correspond to Y/X = RX(X) and X/Y = RY(Y). Therefore, for linear tolerance schedules,
these limits are parabolas in the (X, Y) plane, given by
Y = XRX(X) = aX(1−X) (1)
X = YRY(Y) = bY(1− kY) (2)
Figure 1b is Schelling’s own sketch ([16, Figure 18], see also [15, Figure 1]) of these parabolas, together
with arrows that give an indication of the qualitative dynamics that arise. In modern dynamical systems
nomenclature, Figure 1b is a plot of the system dynamics in the (W, B) phase plane. In our notation,
Figure 1b corresponds to a = b = k = 2.
Schelling explained Figure 1b in terms of static viability and dynamics of movement and identified two
stable equilibria.
• Static viability: Any point that lies within the area of overlap of the two parabolas denotes a statically
viable combination of the W and B populations. Any other point between the W-parabola and the
W-axis represents a mixture of W and B where all the W, but not all the B, will remain. Similarly
any point outside the area of overlap but between the B-parabola and the B-axis represents a mixture
where all the B, but not all the W, will remain. Any point outside both parabolas denotes a mixture
of W and B where neither all of W nor all or B are satisfied.
• Dynamics of movement: Schelling argued qualitatively that outside the area of overlap, some of W or
B are unhappy, so they will move. The area of overlap itself is attractive and so will lead to an influx
of people and hence instability.
• Stable equilibria: Schelling argued that, for the example in Figure 1b, there are two stable equilibria,
both corresponding to a segregated population: the area would contain either all W and no B or it
would be all B and no W (these are the points of intersection of the parabola with the axes). The
statically viable points are not stable, in this case.
Schelling gave another example ([16, Figure 19], see also [15, Figure 2]), for different parameter values,
which resulted in an integrated population. Segregation is also possible in this second case, but the eventual
population mix depends on the initial values of X(t), Y(t).
Schelling considered the following extensions of the BNM:
1. A limit on the number of one of the two types of population, but not both.
2. A limit on the X-population and a limit on the Y-population.
3. A limit on the total population.
4. A range of tolerance schedules.
5. Limiting the ratio X/Y.
6. The effect of perturbations in the system, such as when a group of one type enters or leaves the area.
When such behaviour changes the equilibrium state to which the system converges, this is known as
neighbourhood tipping [16, p.181].
In this paper, we consider 1, 2, 4 and 6 in detail, owing to their analytic tractability. We give analytic
criteria to determine whether equilibria are stable or not and show how limiting a population can introduce
new, stable, equilibria. Extensions 3 and 5 can be considered numerically, using the same methods.
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3 Methods
Schelling’s arguments are qualitative. But modern dynamical systems theory [20] provides the ideal
framework to develop a fully predictive model, that we call a Schelling dynamical system. Suppose we have
an arbitrary dynamical system in two time-dependent population variables X(t), Y(t) of the form
dX
dt
≡ X˙ = F(X, Y) (3)
dY
dt
≡ Y˙ = G(X, Y)
Then the nullclines of (3) are given by the curves F(X, Y) = 0 (when there is no growth in the X-population)
and G(X, Y) = 0 (when there is no growth in the Y-population). Nullclines correspond to curves in(X, Y)-phase plane with the same (zero) slope. The intersection of nullclines gives the equilibria (or fixed
points) of (3), whose stability can then be examined.
Our observation is that the parabolas in Figure 1b correspond to the X- and Y-nullclines of a dynamical
system within the given neighbourhood. In addition, the lines X = 0 and Y = 0 are nullclines. Then the
Schelling dynamical system for a linear tolerance schedule is given by
X˙ = [aX(1−X)−Y] X (4)
Y˙ = [bY(1− kY)−X]Y.
We note that (4) is very similar to a Lotka-Volterra system [20], where growth and decay terms compete to
determine the overall population dynamics. Both a and b have units T−1. Also (4) automatically satisfies
Assumption 1 of section 2 (see discussion below).
Note that we can rescale time tˆ = at and set Y = aZ. Then (4) becomes
X˙ = [X(1−X)− Z] X (5)
Z˙ = [βZ(1− αZ)−X] Z
where
α ≡ ak > 0, β ≡ ab > 0. (6)
We shall study the dynamics of (5) for arbitrary values of α, β, referring to (4) and a, b, k whenever
necessary. Mathematically, it is more natural to work with the (X, Z) variables. But practically, we
are interested in the behaviour of the (X, Y) variables, as was Schelling. So we will alternate between
their usage, depending on the context. Our methods are analytical where possible and numerical where
necessary.
4 Unlimited numbers
We begin with the case referred to by Schelling as unlimited numbers. Here the neighbourhood can take up
to the maximum amount of both populations, so we can have Xmax = 1 or Ymax = 1k , (Zmax = 1α) within the
neighbourhood. We then ask:
• What are the equilibria of (5)?
• Under what conditions are the equilibria of (5) stable?
• How segregated/integrated are such stable equilibria?
• For which initial values of X and Z does the system converge to a stable equilibrium, for fixed values
of α, β?
4
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4.1 Equilibria
Equlibria, or steady state solutions, correspond to X˙ = Z˙ = 0. So (X, Z) = (Xe, Ze) = (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1α) are
equilibria of (4). These correspond, respectively, to: a) the neighbourhood is empty of both populations, b)
the neighbourhood consists of the X-population only and c) the neighbourhood consists of the Z-population
only.
There is also the possibility of other equilibria, corresponding to the intersection of the nullclines
Z = X(1−X) and X = βZ(1− αZ), which happens when there is at least one real root (X, Z) = (Xe, Ze) of
the cubic equation
X3e + a2X2e + a1Xe + a0 = 0 (7)
where Ze = Xe(1−Xe) and we have set
a2 ≡ −2, a1 ≡ 1+ α
α
, a0 ≡ 1− β
αβ
. (8)
We are interested in real (positive) values of (Xe, Ze). A cubic equation with real coefficients such as (7) has
three either one real root and two complex roots or three real roots. In order to distinguish between the
two possibilities, we must calculate the discriminant D of the cubic in (7). Then if D > 0, (7) has one real
root and if D < 0, (7) has three real roots. In (7), D = a22a21 − 4a31 − 4a32a0 − 27a20 + 18a2a1a0, so we have
D = [(4− α)β2 + (4α2 − 18α)β + 27α]
108α3β2
(9)
and hence (7) has three real roots when
β−(α) < β < β+(α) (10)
where
β±(α) = 9α − 2α2 ± 2√α(α − 3)34− α (11)
provided
α > 3. (12)
Thus, we will have three real roots when (α, β) ≡ (ak, ab) lies in the shaded region of Figure 2.
In terms of the original parameters a, b, k, we will have three real roots for equation (7) when
b−(ak) < b < b+(ak) (13)
where
b±(ak) = 9ak − 2a2k2 ± 2√ak(ak − 3)3a(4− ak) (14)
provided
ak > 3. (15)
Note that when β ≡ ab ≤ 1, we have only one real root Xe ≤ 0, which is unphysical.
4.2 Stability analysis
The stability of a equilibrium is determined by the eigenvalues λ1,λ2 of the Jacobian for the system
evaluated at that equilibrium. The Jacobian of (4) is given by
J(X, Z) = ( X(2− 3X)− Z −X−Z βZ(2− 3αZ)−X ) (16)
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Figure 2: Equation (7) has three real roots in the coloured area and one real root outside (and above the dotted line β = 1). The
upper branch is the curve β = β+, which has a vertical asymptote at α = 4. The lower branch is the curve β = β−. The
apex of the coloured region is the point P: (α, β) = (ak, ab) = (3, 9). Below the dashed line β = 1, equation (7) has one
real root Xe < 0. The colour scale shows det(J) evaluated at the equilibrium point corresponding to the intermediate real
root of equation (7), where this root exists.
For the equilibrium (Xe, Ze) = (0, 0), we find that the eigenvalues of J(0, 0) are both zero. So the stability
of this equilibrium is determined by the type of perturbation. But since it corresponds to an empty
neighbourhood, we focus attention on the remaining equilibria.
We next consider the segregated equilibria (1, 0) and (0, 1α). In both cases, both eigenvalues are negative.
For (Xe, Ze) = (1, 0), the (degenerate) eigenvalues are −1, −1. This equilibrium is a stable (degenerate, or
improper) node. The eigenvector is the X-axis. Hence the importance of taking Y = 0 (Z = 0) as a nullcline.
If the initial population consists of members of the X-population only, then they will attract more members
of the same type until (X, Z) = (Xe, Ze) = (1, 0), that is the neighbourhood is filled with the X-population.
For the other equilibrium (Xe, Ze) = (0, 1α), the eigenvalues are − 1α , − βα . This equilibrium is a stable node.
It has eigenvectors spanned by (1, 11−β) and the line X = 0. Hence the importance of taking X = 0 as a
nullcline.
Let us now consider the equilibrium given by the intermediate solution (Xe, Ze) of the cubic in (7),
when 3 real solutions exist. Analytically, this case is a lot harder than the others, so we present our results
numerically. For each point (α, β) in Figure 2, we calculate Xe. Then, since Ze = Xe(1−Xe), we can evaluate
J(Xe, Ze) using (16). We plot det(J) as a function of (α, β) in Figure 2. We have det(J) > 0 in the whole
coloured region, i.e. where (7) has 3 distinct real roots. Since det(J) = λ1λ2, both eigenvalues are either
positive or negative here. Simple inspection shows that both eigenvalues are negative, so the solution is
stable. Similarly, we can show that the other 2 real solutions to (7) have det(J) < 0 and so are both saddles.
Outside the coloured region, we have a single real solution with det(J) < 0 so the single real solution is a
saddle for these values of (α, β).
4.3 Phase portraits and bifurcation diagrams
Figure 3 shows phase portraits, now in the (X, Y) plane, for different values of (a, b, k), together with the
corresponding values of (α, β). Setting (a, b, k) = (2, 2, 2), as in Schelling’s initial example (our Figure 1b),
we obtain the phase portrait shown in Figure 3a. We are in the unshaded area of Figure 2.
We have the same qualitative behaviour as in Figure 1b. Figure 3a also contains quantitative information
about the local direction of movement of the population mix. The bigger the arrow, the faster the movement.
So we see that, in this case, movement toward a segregated X-population is much faster than towards a
segregated Y-population. Movement in the neighbourhood of the fourth equilibrium (a saddle) is almost
6
4 UNLIMITED NUMBERS 4.3 Phase portraits and bifurcation diagrams
imperceptible.
For (a, b, k) = (2, 8, 2), we are in the shaded region of Figure 2. The dynamics are shown in Figure 3b,
where the saddle has now replaced by two saddles and a stable node, as a result of a saddle node (fold)
bifurcation at β = β− (see Figure 4).
For (a, b, k) = (1, 8, 2), we return to the unshaded region of Figure 2. We see the dynamics in Figure 3c,
which is qualitatively similar to Figure 3b. Finally in Figure 3d, when (a, b, k) = (1, 1, 2), we have (α, β) =(2, 1), which corresponds to the case when the cubic equation (7) only has the trivial solution Xe = 0.
(a) (a, b, k) = (2, 2, 2); (α, β) = (4, 4) (b) (a, b, k) = (2, 8, 2); (α, β) = (4, 16)
(c) (a, b, k) = (1, 8, 2); (α, β) = (2, 8) (d) (a, b, k) = (1, 1, 2); (α, β) = (2, 1)
Figure 3: Phase portraits corresponding to different points in Figure 2. Stable equilibria are shown as filled circles, and saddle
points as open circles.
What happens as we cross the curves β = β± in Figure 2? Figure 4(a) shows the fold bifurcations that
occur at β− and β+ when 3 < α < 4. The black lines correspond to (unstable) saddles and the green line to
a stable node. So if we fix α such that 3 < α < 4 and then vary β, there is no stable integrated population
mix for 1 < β < β−. Then for β− < β < β+, we can have a stable integrated population mix, although that
all depends on the initial values of X, Y (see Figure 5). Finally for β > β+, we lose that stable solution via
another fold bifurcation, and the remaining solution is unstable.
In Figure 4(b), when α > 4, we have a single fold at β−. So if we now fix α in this range and vary β,
there is no stable integrated population mix for 1 < β < β−. But for β > β−, we can have a stable integrated
population mix, again depending on the initial values of X, Y (see Figure 5).
It is only possible to have an integrated population mix when α > 3 from (12) (that is ak > 3 from (15)).
In socio-economic terms, if k = 1 for example, this result means that there must exist some population of
each type that is content to live in up to a 3 ∶ 1 minority in order for a stable mixed state to be possible. So
7
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(a) 3 < α < 4 (b) α > 4
Figure 4: Bifurcation diagrams showing saddles (black) and stable nodes (green). At least one saddle point exists whenever β > 1.
criterion (15) is a generalisation to arbitrary k of Schelling’s observation [16, p.172] that “For straight-line
tolerance schedules and equal numbers of the two colors, there is no intersection of the two parabolas
unless the tolerance schedules have vertical intercepts of 3.0, with median tolerance of 1.5".
5 Neighbourhood tipping and basins of attraction
When discussing the time-evolution of the BNM, Schelling [16, p.181] considers the possibility that "a
recognizable new minority enters a neighbourhood in sufficient numbers to cause the earlier residents to
begin evacuating". In dynamical systems terms, this means that a perturbation of the system may give rise
to a different equilibrium point. In social science terms, this is the phenomenon known as neighbourhood
tipping, which we now consider within the framework of dynamical systems.
The basin of attraction of a (necessarily stable) equilibrium (Xe, Ye) is the set of initial conditions (X, Y)
that lead to (Xe, Ye), under the action of the dynamical system. Unstable equilibria can not have basins of
attraction (although the stable manifolds of saddles do divide phase space). Since our dynamical system
is deterministic (no noise), each initial condition belongs to one basin of attraction. Thus neighbourhood
tipping occurs when a perturbation moves the state of a system from one basin of attraction to another.
In Schelling’s work it is (tacitly) assumed that tipping points correspond to the boundaries of the
parabolas (nullclines) of Figure 1b. But this can not be the case owing to the presence of saddle points. We
have computed the basins of attraction for the stable equilibria. Figure 5 shows these areas of phase space
for the cases given in Figure 3.
6 Limiting individual populations
Schelling [16, Figure 22, p173.] stated that “limiting the numbers allowed to be present in the [neighbour-
hood] can sometimes produce a stable mixture". We now show exactly how such stable mixtures can be
achieved.
6.1 New equilibria
Let us restrict the X-population to a maximum value of u, where u ∈ (0, 1), as shown in Figure 6. The Z-
population is not restricted and so the corresponding maximum tolerance limit of the X-population
is unchanged at (X, Z) = ( β4α , 12α). When the X-population is at its limiting value X = u, we have
8
6 LIMITING INDIVIDUAL POPULATIONS 6.1 New equilibria
(a) (a, b, k) = (2, 2, 2); (α, β) = (4, 4) (b) (a, b, k) = (2, 8, 2); (α, β) = (4, 16)
(c) (a, b, k) = (1, 8, 2); (α, β) = (2, 8) (d) (a, b, k) = (1, 1, 2); (α, β) = (2, 1)
Figure 5: Blue regions correspond to the basin of attraction of X-only equilibrium (1, 0), and red regions to the basin of attraction
of the Y-only equilibrium (0, 1k ). White denotes the basin of attraction of the stable mixed state (integrated population
mix) obtained from (7) when it exists.
Z = Zu ≡ u(1− u). Then it is clear that we need to have
u < β
4α
for the limiting of the X-population to have any effect. Then the new population mixtures will correspond
to the intersections Z = Z± of the line X = u with the parabola X = βZ(1− αZ). Hence
Z± = 12α
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣1±
¿ÁÁÀ1− 4αu
β
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ . (17)
In general Z− ≤ Z+. If Zu < Z− < Z+, no new intersections can be created by restricting the X-population
and any existing equilibrium does not change. If Z− < Zu < Z+, then no new intersections can be created by
restricting the X-population and the existing equilibrium will change. But if Z− < Z+ < Zu (the case shown
in Figure 6), then we may be able to produce new population mixes.
Our aim is to find a curve in the (α, β) plane which separates regions where a new stable integrated
population mix is possible by limiting the X-population from regions where it is not. Points on this curve
must satisfy
Xe = u = β4α , Ze = Zu = Z− = Z+ = 12α , (18)
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Figure 6: Limiting the X-population: the case when u < β4α and Z− < Z+ < Zu.
which happens when
β = 2(α ±√α2 − 2α). (19)
Now suppose that we do not the restrict the X-population, but that the Z-population is restricted to
Z = v, where v ∈ (0, 1α). Similar reasoning as before shows that we need
v < 1
4
for the limiting of the Z-population to have any effect. When Z = v, we have that Xv = βv(1− αv) and the
line Z = v crosses the X-population tolerance limit where
X± = 12 [1±√1− 4v] . (20)
Then the curve in the (α, β) plane which separates regions where a new stable integrated population mix is
possible by limiting the Z-population from regions where it is not is given by
Xe = Xu = X− = X+ = 1
α
, Ye = v = 14 , (21)
which happens when
β = 8
4− α . (22)
Results (19) and (22) are shown in Figure 7. New population mixes can be created to the right of the blue
curve, given by (19), by restricting the X-population and to the left of the red curve, given by (22), by
restricting the Z-population.
10
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Figure 7: New population mixes can be created to the right of the blue curves, given by (19), by restricting the X-population and
to the left of the red curves, given by (22), by restricting the Z-population. (a) The tolerance limits at the four points
labelled (a), (b), (c) and (d) are shown in Figure 8. The black curves are from Figure 2. (b) Detail around the point P:(α, β) = (3, 9).
6.2 Stability of new equilibria
Even though we may be able to create new population mixes by limiting a particular population, we do not
know if that new mix is stable or not. We shall now answer that question.
When X = u, the dynamics of the Z-population is governed by
Z˙ = [βZ(1− αZ)− u] Z. (23)
The stability of the equilibrium Z = Z± of (23) is determined by the eigenvalue
λu± = β2α
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣−(1− 4αuβ )∓
¿ÁÁÀ1− 4αu
β
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ . (24)
For u ∈ [0, β4α ], we can see that λu± ≶ 0. So Z+ is always stable and Z− is always unstable. Hence if we are
able to restrict the X-population (so we choose α, β to the right of the blue curve in Figure 7), we will
always produce a new population mix that is always stable.
When Z = v, the dynamics of the X-population is governed by
X˙ = [X(1−X)− v] X. (25)
The stability of the equilibrium X = X± of (25) is determined by the eigenvalue
λv± = 12 [−(1− 4v)∓√1− 4v] . (26)
For v ∈ [0, 14 ], we can see that λv± ≶ 0. So X+ is always stable and X− is always unstable. Hence if we are
able to restrict the Z-population (so we choose α, β to the left of the red curve in Figure 7), we will always
produce a new population mix that is always stable.
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6.3 Tolerance limits
The tolerance limits are shown in Figure 8, at each of the four points (a), (b), (c) and (d) of figure 7(a). In
each case, when both populations are unrestricted, the only stable equilibria are fully segregated; there
are no stable integrated population mix. In this section, we demonstrate how a limit on population can
produce a new stable population mix.
In Figure 8, we have introduced candidate cut-off values X = u and Y = v are shown as black dashed
lines. In order to introduce new fixed points, we must have u < 12αRY( 12α) or v < 12 RX( 12), i.e. the limit of
one type must intersect the nullcline of the other type. There are two such lines in figure 8b and one each
in figures 8a and 8d. Basins of attraction are coloured as in figure 5 and, in figure 8c, we have 2 stable
mixed states, with basins of attraction coloured white and gray.
In fact, we can in fact create up to 7 new equilibria as a result of limiting numbers when α and β lie in
the lozenge-shaped region containing in figure 7(b), by choosing u and v accordingly.
(a) (α, β) = (1.5, 5); (a, b, k) = ( 34 , 203 , 2). (b) (α, β) = (2.9, 8.35); (a, b, k) = (1.45, 5.76, 2).
(c) (α, β) = (1.5, 2); (a, b, k) = ( 34 , 83 , 2). (d) (α, β) = (5, 5); (a, b, k) = ( 52 , 2, 2).
Figure 8: The tolerance limits at each of the four points (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Figure 7(a), with candidate cut-off values shown as a
black dashed lines. Note that k = 2 in all four examples, and basins of attraction are coloured as in Figure 5, with gray
used to denote the basin of attraction of an additional stable mixed state.
7 Different tolerance schedules
The use of linear tolerance schedules, as in Figure 1a simplifies the analysis. But quantitative results [6]
show that modifications to the linear tolerance schedule may better describe the social context. Schelling
12
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[16, Figures 25-29] also used nonlinear tolerance schedules.
In this section, we show how our approach can be modified to take account of different tolerance
schedules and study their dynamics. All possible tolerance schedules must satisfy RX(0) = 1, RX(1) =
0, RY(0) = β, RY( 1k ) = 0, in terms of the original populations X, Y.
After suitable scalings, our Schelling dynamical system for general tolerance schedules RX(X), RZ(Z)
can be written as
X˙ = [XRX(X)− Z] X (27)
Z˙ = [ZRZ(Z)−X] Z.
To find equilibria solutions (X, Z) = (Xe, Ze), we must find positive solutions of
Ze = XeRX(Xe), (28)
Xe = ZeRZ(Ze).
To examine the stability of these equilibria, we must calculate the eigenvalues of the Jacobian
J(X, Z) = ⎛⎝ 2XRX(X)+X2 dRX(X)dX − Z −X−Z 2ZRZ(Z)+ Z2 dRZ(Z)dZ −X ⎞⎠ , (29)
evaluated at (X, Z) = (Xe, Ze). Stable population mixes will have both eigenvalues negative.
7.1 Polynomial functions
Departing from linear tolerance schedules, our simplest choice is a polynomial function. Consider the
following:
RX(X) =RPpX(X) ≡ (1−Xp) , (30)
RZ(Z) =RPqZ(Z) ≡ β (1− αqZq) ,
where p, q ∈N+ are positive integers. For p = q = 1 we have the linear tolerance schedules (5). Larger values
of p, q give more tolerant populations.
To find equilibria, we must solve the following equation for Xe ≥ 0:
(−1)q+1Xp(q+1)+qe + q∑
k=1(−1)k(q + 1k )Xpk+qe +Xqe + 1αq Xpe + 1− βαqβ = 0 (31)
and then ensure that Ze = Xe(1−Xpe ) is also positive. When p = q = 1, (31) reduces to (7).
Since (31) has p(q + 1)+ q roots, it would appear that this choice of tolerance schedule could give us
more non-trivial equilibria for increased p, q. However Descartes’ rule of signs applied to (31) shows us that
there are at most q + 2 real positive values of Xe. But for several of these solutions, we find Ze < 0. In fact,
since the tolerance schedules are generalised parabolae, it turns out that we have only a maximum of three
solutions of (31) where both Xe > 0 and Ze > 0. Numerical methods must be used to find these solutions.
Another choice of polynomial is possible, which results in a less tolerant population. Consider
RX(X) =RQrX(X) ≡ (1−X)r (32)
RZ(Z) =RQsZ(Z) ≡ β (1− αZ)s .
As before, the equilibria are those roots of a high order polynomial that satisfy both Xe > 0 and Ze > 0. This
polynomial is found using the multinomial theorem and its roots must be calculated numerically. As before,
we observe that we only have a maximum of three such solutions. Hence the change to a polynomial
tolerance schedule does not produce extra integrated equilibria.
Note that the choice of functions RPpX(X), RPqZ(Z), RQrX(X), RQsZ(Z) are not unique.
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7.2 Exponential functions
Another possible tolerance schedule involves the use of exponential functions. Consider
RX(X) =REµX(X) ≡ 11− e−µ (e−µX − e−µ) (33)
RZ(Z) =REνZ(Z) ≡ β1− e− να (e−νZ − e− να ) ,
where µ, ν > 0. Equilibria and their stability properties have to be calculated numerically.
Figure 9 illustrates the effect of exponential tolerance schedules, in terms of the original X, Y populations.
In Figure 9a, we take RE4X and RE
4
Y, with a = b = 10 and k = 1. In Figure 9b we revert to a linear tolerance
schedule for the Y-population, taking RE4X , RP
1
Y, a = b = 10, k = 1. We observe that changing the tolerance
schedule of one population, so that they become more tolerant, can result in the loss of a stable mixed
state. We can understand this phenomenon by considering an initial condition (X0, Y0) that lies close to the
peak of the X-nullcline. The key is that Y˙ has changed sign from negative to positive at (X0, Y0). We can
interpret this intuitively as follows: "some Ys wanted to leave, but now they’re more tolerant, they’re happy
to stay. In fact, Ys are so happy that Ys come in, which makes Xs want to leave".
(a) Phase portrait with RE4X , RE
4
Y , a = b = 10, k = 1 (b) Phase portraits with RE4X , RP1Y , a = 10, b = 10, k = 1
Figure 9: Phase portraits demonstrating that a globally more tolerant minority population can eliminate a stable mixed state
For further examples of phase portraits with different tolerance schedules, the reader is referred to the
PhD thesis of the first author, available at D. Haw’s PhD thesis.
8 Discussion, conclusions and further work
We have taken Schelling’s [15, 16] bounded neighbourhood model (BNM) and derived a (scaled) dynamical
system (5) that allows for phase-plane analysis. In doing so, we can identify terms in the governing
equations and attach social meaning to each of them. The details vary slightly between different tolerance
schedules, but the basic principles can be illustrated by using the linear tolerance schedule. In this case, the
dynamical system (5) is reproduced here in an expanded form for convenience.
X˙ = X2 −X3 −XZ (34)
Z˙ = βZ2 − αβZ3 −XZ.
Let us consider the first equation in (34). The term X2 represents growth of the X-population, as it
enters the neighbourhood, unhindered by lack of space or the presence of the Z-population. It is a measure
of the intrinsic popularity of the neighbourhood. The term X3 represents a decay in the X-population,
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corresponding to a reduction in available space in the neighbourhood as the population expands, brought
about by the finite size of the neighbourhood. The term XZ represents a decay in the X-population induced
by the presence of Z-population. Similar considerations apply to the Z-population dynamics, given by the
second equation in (34).
In summary, the dynamics of one population in the presence of another can be summarised as follows
{rate of population change} = {intrinsic popularity of neighbourhood}− {finite size of neighbourhood}− {presence of other population} (35)
The precise form of these terms could be determined by field experiments. By approaching the dynamics
from this perspective, we have a complementary approach to that of the tolerance schedule.
The categorisation of all possible equilibria and the partitioning of phase-space into basins of attraction
allow us describe the dynamics of segregation with respect to key parameters of the system. In particular,
saddle points are a common feature of dynamics, and yield dynamics that are fundamentally different to
the intuitive description given in Schelling’s paper.
Many additional variants of the BNM are possible, including the use of other non-linear tolerance
schedules, limiting the total population present, and limiting the ration X/Y. The analytic intractability of
such systems means that a computational approach is necessary.
Further work involves generalising Schelling’s BNM to describe systems of neighbouring geographical
areas and the flow of populations between them. Also, access to demographic data with multiple time-points
may help to derive realistic parameter estimates and tolerance schedules.
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